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Quantum cryptography is anticipated to be a major ingredient of future quantum internet that
promises various secure communication tasks. Quantum conference key agreement (CKA) is an
important cryptographic primitives of quantum cryptography, which provides the unconditionally
secure conference key among multiple users simultaneously. However, it is far from practical appli-
cation and, more pessimistically, the conference key rate has recently been shown to be limited by
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger distribution capacity of quantum network. Here, we propose, surpris-
ingly, a quantum CKA of three users to beat the repeaterless capacity even under coherent attacks.
Besides, our protocol only requires the phase-randomized weak coherent sources and threshold
single-photon detectors, thus can be experimentally demonstrated over 500 km fiber under current
technology. Our new type of protocol paves the way towards large-scale quantum CKA network of
future quantum internet.
Quantum internet promises perfect security for var-
ious communication tasks, which is an infrastructure
consisted of numerous quantum cryptographic networks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote
users to share unconditionally secure key based on quan-
tum laws [1, 2], which has stepped into building an in-
tegrated network from satellite to ground. In addition,
there are kinds of multiparty cryptographic primitives
beyond two users, for example, conference key agree-
ment (CKA) [3, 4]. It allows at least three users to share
the common (conference) keys, which offers security for
countless applications, such as netmeeting, online edu-
cation and telemedicine. This conference key promises
group encryption for legitimate users, in which any mem-
ber of that group can decrypt the message. Quantum
CKA allows multiple users to share the conference key
with information-theoretic security simultaneously em-
ploying multipartite entanglement [5–7], which general-
izes the QKD to multiple users and is also called multi-
partite QKD [8].
Quantum CKA has been a research hotspot. The
secure quantum CKA is acquired and used for
measurement-device-independence [9] under realistic
conditions via post-selected Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) entanglement [10, 11]. The measurement-device-
independent quantum CKA has been generalized exten-
sively to various cases of finite size [12, 13], continuous
variables [14, 15] and four users with W state [16]. By
directly distributing GHZ entanglement source, quan-
tum CKA has been proved to drastically outperform
QKD in resource expense for group communication [17].
Besides, the finite-key analysis with composable secu-
rity [18], device-independence [19, 20] and other special
cases [21–23] are also considered in quantum CKA. In
particular, the experimental demonstration of quantum
CKA has been implemented recently over 50 km fiber us-
ing the state-of-the-art four-photon GHZ entanglement
source [24].
Although progress towards quantum CKA has been
made in steps, the low conference key rate, short trans-
mission distance, and excessive resource cost seriously
restrict the real life applications. More importantly, it
has been shown recently that the conference key rate is
rigorously limited by the GHZ entanglement distribution
capacity of quantum network [25–27]. The repeaterless
bound of the conference key rate is the linear scaling
of total channel transmittance ηb, which can be given
by R1b = ηb [25] or R
2
b = − log2(1 − ηb) [26, 27]. In
order to overcome this limitation, one may utilize the
aid of quantum repeater [28], multi-user scheme of adap-
tive measurement-device-independence [29], and post-
selected W state with single-photon interference [30].
However, these approaches remain difficult to be imple-
mented.
In this Letter, we propose a feasible scheme for
three-user quantum CKA protocol merely using phase-
randomized weak coherent sources and threshold single
photon detectors. Our protocol can be experimentally
demonstrated over 500 km fiber with recently developed
technology in twin-field QKD [31–33]. The conference
key rate of our protocol scales with the square-root of
the total channel transmittance, O(
√
ηb), which will sur-
pass the above-mentioned repeaterless bound for the case
of large attenuation. The security proof of our protocol,
surprisingly, still utilizes the entanglement distillation [9–
11] of a virtual GHZ state with optical mode. From a
fundamental viewpoint, our scheme highlights that the
entanglement of optical mode is enough for providing the
security of quantum cryptography although it cannot be
used for Bell nonlocal given solely photon-counting tech-
niques.
As depicted in Fig 1, our practical quantum CKA pro-
tocol employs the same devices as twin-field QKD [32,
33], so it can be directly realized without any difficulty.
Here, we choose the decoy-state quantum CKA with
three intensities to simplify the experiment, despite that
the number of intensity is optional. Hereafter, |0〉 and |1〉
form the photon number Hilbert space for vacuum and
2FIG. 1. The setup of quantum CKA protocol. Alice and Bob
exploit continuous-wave laser to generate the global phase sta-
bilized coherent light. They employ intensity modulator (IM),
phase modulator (PM) and attenuator (Att) to implement the
pulse preparation, decoy-state, phase randomization, phase
encoding and weak-light modulation. Charlie directly mea-
sures the pulses sent by Alice and Bob with detectors D1 and
D2, respectively, as the Z basis measurement. Only detector
D1 (D2) click represents logic bit value 0 (1), which means
that a quantum state |1〉
a
|0〉
b
(|0〉
a
|1〉
b
) has been detected.
Charlie performs an interference with beam splitter (BS) and
detectors D3 and D4, as the X basis measurement. Only
detector D3 (D4) click denotes logic bit value 0 (1), which
means that an entangled state |ψ+〉
ab
= 1√
2
(|1〉
a
|0〉
b
+|0〉
a
|1〉
b
)
(|ψ−〉
ab
= 1√
2
(|1〉
a
|0〉
b
−|0〉
a
|1〉
b
)) has been acquired. To sim-
plify, Charlie applies a passive-basis choice.
single photon. Let post-selected phase-matching denote
the effective events with −δ+rpi ≤ θa−θb−ϕab ≤ δ+rpi(
mod 2pi), where θa and θb are the random global phases
and r = 0, 1. Here ϕab is the phase difference between
the reference frames of Alice and Bob, which can be ob-
tained by strong light reference [32, 33]. The successful
probability of post-selected phase-matching is ppm =
2δ
pi
for the assumption of continuous phase randomization.
Our protocol has three legitimate users, Alice, Bob and
Charlie. Let xa ⊕ xb 6= xc denote the bit error of the X
basis, where xa is the logic bit value of Alice in the X
basis. The detailed protocol is described as follows.
Preparation. Alice and Bob independently and ran-
domly choose the Z and X bases. Alice (Bob) prepares
phase-randomized weak coherent pulses using intensity
0 (µ) with probability 1 − t (t) for logic bit 0 (1) in
the Z basis. Alice (Bob) generates phase-randomized
weak coherent pulses |ei(θa+xapi)√ka〉 (|ei(θb+xbpi)
√
kb〉)
for logic bit xa (xb) in the X basis, with xa, xb ∈ {0, 1},
θa, θb ∈ [0, 2pi) and ka, kb ∈ {µ, ν, 0}. They send the opti-
cal pulses to Charlie through the insecure quantum chan-
nels with the same loss. Measurement. Charlie randomly
measures the received pulse pairs in the Z and X bases.
For the Z basis, one and only one click between detectors
D1 and D2 reveals a successful event. For the X basis,
one and only one click between detectors D3 and D4 in-
dicates a successful outcome. Reconciliation. For each
successful measurement event, Alice, Bob, and Charlie
announce the basis information. Alice and Bob publish
the intensity information unless Alice, Bob, and Charlie
all select the Z basis. Alice and Bob disclose the global
phase and perform post-selected phase-matching when
they both choose intensity ν and Charlie selects the X
basis. All classical communications among Alice, Bob,
and Charlie are transmitted via the authenticated classi-
cal channel. Alice always flips her logic bit if choosing Z
basis. She will flip her logic bit if selecting X basis and
r = 1. Parameter estimation. Alice, Bob, and Charlie
adopt the data of the Z basis as the raw key. The other
cases are exploited to estimate the leaked information.
Postprocessing. They extract the common conference key
using classical error correction, error verification and pri-
vacy amplification.
Security proof.—Here, we will exploit the entanglement
distillation argument of the GHZ state [9–11] to provide
security against coherent attacks.
First. We consider a virtual entanglement-based pro-
tocol, called P1. (i) Charlie prepares the GHZ entangled
state with optical mode
|φabc〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉a|0〉b|+z〉c + |0〉a|1〉b|−z〉c)
=
1√
2
(|ψ+〉ab|+x〉c + |ψ−〉ab|−x〉c) ,
(1)
where a and b are the optical modes while c is a qubit
system. Qubits |±z〉 and |±x〉 are the eigenstates of Z
and X bases. Charlie measures the qubit system c in Z
and X bases to obtain his logic bit. (ii) He sends the op-
tical modes a and b to Alice and Bob, respectively. Ob-
viously, the density matrix meets ρ1ab =
1
2 (|10〉ab〈10| +
|01〉ab〈01|) = 12 (|ψ+〉ab〈ψ+|ab + |ψ−〉ab〈ψ−|ab) that de-
notes the joint single-photon state between Alice and
Bob. (iii) Alice and Bob independently and randomly
choose the Z basis with {|0〉, |1〉} and the X basis with{
|1〉+|0〉√
2
, |1〉−|0〉√
2
}
to measure the received optical modes.
(iv) They utilize data of the Z basis as raw key while
data of the X basis are used to estimate Eve’s eavesdrop-
ping [9]. (v) They exploit the classical postprocessing to
generate final key.
Second. We consider a virtual prepare-and-measure
protocol, named P2, which is equivalent to P1. (i’) In-
stead of preparing GHZ entangled state, Charlie directly
generates optical modes |1〉a|0〉b and |0〉a|1〉b for his logic
bits 0 and 1 if selecting the Z basis. He directly prepares
optical modes |ψ+〉ab and |ψ−〉ab for his logic bits 0 and
1 if choosing the X basis. Thus, P2 is composed of step
(i’) as well as steps (ii)—(v) from P1.
Third. Let P3 represent a virtual time-reversed pro-
tocol of P2. (i”) Alice randomly prepares optical modes
|0〉a and |1〉a for her logic bits 0 and 1 in the Z basis. She
3randomly generates optical modes
|1〉
a
+|0〉
a√
2
and
|1〉
a
−|0〉
a√
2
for her logic bits 0 and 1 in the X basis. Likewise, Bob
does the same. (ii”) They send the optical modes to
Charlie. (iii”) He performs the Z basis measurement
with {|10〉ab, |01〉ab} and the X basis measurement with
{|ψ+〉ab, |ψ−〉ab} to acquire his logic bit. Thus, P3 is
composed of steps (i”)—(iii”) as well as steps (iv)—(v)
from P1. We remark that the above three protocols are
equivalent only in the case of lossless and ideal detector.
We should assume an additional step where Alice and
Bob can know these cases of joint single-photon state ρ1ab
in Z and X bases. This step ensures that the state de-
tected (joint single-photon state) by Charlie in step (iii”)
of P3 is exactly equal to what he prepared in step (i’)
of P2 even in the loss channel and threshold detector.
After adding this step, for the joint single-photon state
case, P3 is always equivalent to P2 and P1.
Here, we present a feasible protocol that has the above-
mentioned additional step, called the ideal protocol. Al-
ice randomly sends optical modes |0〉 and |1〉 by using
the vacuum and single-photon source with probabilities
1 − t and t in the Z basis. Alice randomly generates
phase-randomized coherent state |ei(θa+xapi)√ka〉 in the
X basis. Likewise, Bob does the same. The above addi-
tional setup is realized in this ideal protocol as follows:
Alice and Bob implement post-selected phase-matching
and only consider the case of one photon in the X ba-
sis [34], such as
|√ν〉a|±
√
ν〉b
one photon−−−−−−−→ |10〉ab ± |01〉ab√
2
= |ψ±〉ab, (2)
which form the joint single-photon state in X basis. The
cases of |10〉ab and |01〉ab with total probability 2t(1− t)
form joint single-photon state in the Z basis and can be
utilized to extract key under the tagging model [35].
Following the entanglement distillation argument [9],
the asymptotic conference key rate of the ideal protocol
is given by
R˜ = 2t(1− t)Y z1 [1− h(ex1)]− λ˜EC, (3)
where Y d1 and e
d
1 are the yield and bit error rate of the
joint single-photon state given that all users choose theD
basis, with D ∈ {Z,X}. Here, the phase error rate of the
Z basis is the same with bit error rate of the X basis in
the asymptotic regime [9]. λ˜EC is the leaked information
in classical error correction. h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 −
x) log2(1 − x) is the binary Shannon entropy. Note that
one should let t < 8% by considering the bit error rate
of the Z basis.
By using the phase-randomized weak coherent source
to replace the single-photon source, we propose a practi-
cal three-user quantum CKA protocol, as shown in Fig 1.
Thus, the asymptotic conference key rate of the practical
FIG. 2. Conference key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale
as a function of the total transmission distance using the ex-
perimental parameters in Table I. For comparison, we also
draw the curves of the ideal protocol, the repeaterless bound
1: R1b = ηb [25] and bound 2: R
2
b = − log2(1 − ηb) [26, 27].
Our simulation results show clearly that the transmission dis-
tance of our practical protocol can be over 550 km fiber in
realistic condition and beat the repeaterless bound.
protocol can be written as
R = 2t(1− t){e−µY z0 + µe−µY z1 [1− h(ex1)]} − λEC,
(4)
where Y z0 is the yield that both Alice and Bob send vac-
uum state when all users choose the Z basis. λEC =
Qzfh(Ez) is the revealed information in classical error
correction. The gain Qz and quantum bit error rate Ez
of the Z basis can be directly acquired in experiment,
where Ez is the maximum value among the bit error rates
of Alice-Bob, Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie. The yields
Y d0 = Q
d
00 and Y
d
1 can be estimated by exploiting the
decoy-state method [36, 37],
Y d1 ≥
µ/2
µν − ν2
(
eνQdν −
ν2
µ2
eµQdµ −
µ2 − ν2
µ2
Qd0
)
, (5)
where we define Qdk = Q
d
k0 + Q
d
0k. Q
d
kakb
is the gain
of Charlie selecting the D basis given that Alice and
Bob send intensities ka and kb. For Y
x
1 , we employ the
fact that 12 (|10〉ab〈10| + |01〉ab〈01|) = 12 (|ψ+〉ab〈ψ+|ab +
|ψ−〉ab〈ψ−|ab). The bit error rate ex1 can be bounded by
ex1 ≤
1
2νY x1 ppm
(
e2νExννQ
x
νν −
ppm
2
Y x0
)
, (6)
where Exνν and Q
x
νν are the bit error rate and gain of
Charlie selecting the X basis when Alice and Bob both
send intensity ν and they successfully perform the post-
selected phase-matching.
In order to show the performance of our quantum CKA
protocol, we utilize the practical parameters in Table I
for simulation that has been recently realized over 500
km fiber in twin-field QKD [32]. The conference key rate
of our practical quantum CKA protocol as a function
4FIG. 3. Conference key rates of the practical protocol in loga-
rithmic scale as a function of the total distance with different
misalignment rates of the X basis. The conference key rate
can also surpass the repeaterless bound even when the mis-
alignment rate is up to exd = 13%.
TABLE I. Simulation parameters [32]. ηd and pd are the
detector efficiency and dark count rate. exd is the misalignment
rate of the X basis. α is the attenuation coefficient of the
ultralow-loss fiber. f is the error correction efficiency.
ηd pd e
x
d α f δ ν
56% 10−8 3.5% 0.167 1.1 pi/18 0.1
of the total transmission distance L among three users
is shown in Fig. 2. Here, we assume that the efficien-
cies and dark count rates of Charlie’s detectors are the
same and the distances of Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie
are both L/2. To display the conference key rate of our
protocol scaling with the square-root of the total chan-
nel transmittance, we define
√
η = ηd × 10−αL/20 and
ηb = ηd × 10−αL/10, detailed simulation calculation can
be found in Supplemental Material. We numerically op-
timize the conference key rate over the free parameters
t and µ. Our practical quantum CKA protocol can sur-
pass the repeaterless bound at the distance of 260 km.
Compared with the practical protocol, the ideal proto-
col can beat the repeaterless bound even at the distance
of 160 km, which also shows the importance to develop
ideal single-photon source.
Besides, the bit error rate Ez can be bounded by ad-
justing probability t, which has no misalignment of chan-
nel. Therefore, our practical protocol can always extract
conference key as long as the misalignment rate of X
basis exd < 50% in principle. As shown in Fig 3, the
conference key rate of the practical protocol can surpass
the repeaterless bound even when the misalignment rate
is larger than 13%. The secure transmission distance is
larger than 500 km in the case of exd = 7%. These results
indicate that our quantum CKA is practical and feasible
even in the field environment.
In summary, by employing a special GHZ state, we
have proposed a practical quantum CKA protocol that
allows three users to share the information-theoretically
secure conference key. Its conference key rate scales as
O(
√
η) rather than the total transmittance, which can
beat the fundamental bound on the private capacity of
quantum network [25–27]. This protocol exploits the
same devices and technology as twin-field QKD [31, 32]
and as such, it can be demonstrated by current tech-
nology over 500 km fiber. New results are significantly
beyond what one could expect for quantum CKA in pre-
vious works. We believe that the practical quantum CKA
protocol can be widely implemented to build the large-
scale quantum cryptographic network. We expect that
the entanglement of optical mode will be used for other
cryptography primitives to drastically improve the per-
formance.
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